Introduction
In 1973-75 Gibbard and Satterthwaite published a fundamental impossibility theorem which states that every non-dictatorial social choice function, whose range contains at least three alternatives, at certain profiles can be manipulated by a single individual voter [6, 15] . After that, the natural question arose: if there are no perfect rules, which ones are the best, i.e. least manipulable? To this question there can be no absolute answer -it depends both on the behaviour of the voters, and on the measure used to quantify the term "manipulability".
Among models of voter behaviour, the following two have gained the most attention ( [3, 14] ). The Impartial Culture (IC) model assumes that voters are independent, and that each voter is equally likely to vote for any candidate. The Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) model assumes some degree of dependency. This paper concerns itself with the IC model.
Among measures of manipulability, the most popular is the probability that the votes fall in such a way as to create the (coalitional or individual) "logical possibility of manipulation" ( [4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14] ). This means that some coalition of voters (or individual voter) with incentive to do so can change the election result by voting insincerely. Counterthreats are not considered -we assume that the manipulator(s) are not opposed by the other, naive voters. The probability of manipulability has been especially well-studied for the important class of positional (scoring) voting rules, and significant progress has been made in comparing them. In his seminal paper [14] , Saari showed that in his "geometric" model, Borda's rule is the least manipulable for the three-alternative case in relation to micro manipulation, but that this does not extend to the case of four alternatives.
In this paper, we further refine this notion of manipulability by considering the sizes of the coalitions involved. Intuitively, a rule is more resistant to manipulation if many voters must be recruited to assemble the manipulating coalition, and less resistant if only a few voters are required. We may thus consider the probability that a coalition of at most k voters can manipulate (k = 1, 2, . . .). Equivalently, we study the probability distribution of the size of the smallest manipulating coalition (a random variable). Similar ideas are explored, in a more limited way, in [12] and [13] .
We use the following notation and assumptions throughout. An election is held to choose one from among m candidates (m ≥ 3). There are n voters, who hold opinions according to the IC model. That is, each voter (independently) chooses one of the m! possible types (preference orders on the candidates), each type being equally likely to be chosen. The election uses the positional voting rule with score vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ), where 1 = w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ · · · ≥ w m = 0. That is, a vote ranking candidate α in ith place contributes w i to the score of α, and the candidate with the greatest total score is declared the winner. The possibility of a tie for first place will not be considered in this paper, as Proposition 3 makes it largely irrelevant; it is discussed in detail in [13] . We aim to describe the limiting probability distribution of the minimum manipulating coalition size as n → ∞, and to use this as a criterion for comparing the rules.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section records some basic results regarding IC behaviour in large populations. The long section 3 is the theoretical core of the paper: it defines the manipulation problem as an integer linear program and then, through a series of simplifications, shows how this may be replaced by a much simpler linear program. Readers impatient to reach the main results may wish to skip much of this section at a first reading. The desired limiting probability distributions are derived in section 4, and used in section 5 to compare the rules. Section 6 contains some conclusions.
Asymptotic results for large electorates of IC voters
Let C be the set of candidates, and T the set of all voter types (i.e. all permutations of C). Let N = (N t ) t∈T be the random vector giving the number of voters of each type (so t∈T N t = n). For IC voter behaviour, N has a multinomial probability distribution with mean (n/m!)1. (Here and subsequently, the notation 1 is used to denote a vector whose entries are all 1.) Under the asymptotic conditions of interest to us, this may be approximated by a multivariate normal distribution. 
where p = 1/m!, and Σ is the matrix with entries
Remark. Here and in the rest of this paper, the notation → D denotes convergence in distribution (see [5, Ch. 2]). Note that the limiting multivariate normal distribution is degenerate, being supported on (q t ) t∈T : t∈T q t = 0 .
Proof. Since IC voters choose their types at random, and independently, we have N = n i=1 X i , where X 1 , . . . , X n are independent and have probability distribution assigning probability 1/m! to each of the unit vectors of R T . Note that E [X 1 ] = p1 and the covariance matrix of X 1 is Σ. The result then follows by the central limit theorem ([5, p.170]).
We use the notation σ t (α) for the contribution to candidate α's score made by a vote of type t (so if t ranks α in ith place, then σ t (α) = w i ). The total score of α is then |α| = t∈T N t σ t (α).
Let S = (|α|) α∈C be the vector of candidates' scores (the "scoreboard"). Proposition 1 immediately gives a central limit result for S, too.
wherew, σ w are the mean and standard deviation of the score vector w (i.e.w = (w 1 + · · · + w m )/m and σ 2 w = (w 2 1 + · · · + w 2 m )/m − (w) 2 ); Z is a vector, indexed by C, of independent standard normal random variables; and Z = 1 m α Z α . Proof. Let Y = (Y t ) t∈T ∼ N (0, Σ). From Proposition 1 we have
where U α = t∈T Y t σ t (α). It only remains to show that U and σ w m m−1 1/2 (Z −Z1) have the same multivariate normal distribution. For this, it suffices to observe that they have the same mean (zero), variances, and covariances. It is routine to check that
Proposition 2 implies that under IC behaviour in large electorates, the average candidate's score will be of order n, but the variability among the scores will be of order only √ n. Consequently, most elections will result in all candidates receiving relatively similar scores, and the margin of victory will be small. However, exact ties in the scores become increasingly rare as the number of voters increases. The following result establishes this formally. Proof. For two distinct candidates α and β, we have
where G = s ∈ R C : s α = s β . By Proposition 2 (and [5, p.87]), since G is an open set we have
That is, P (|α| = |β|) → 0 as n → ∞. The result follows since
Approximations of the minimum manipulating coalition size.
In this section, we formulate the coalitional manipulation problem as an integer linear program. We then show, via a series of simplifying steps, that this is well approximated by a much simpler linear program in which there are only two variables, and in which the constraint set does not depend on the voting situation, but only on the voting rule. Since the proofs involved are fairly lengthy, we summarize the steps involved before embarking on them:
• The problem of assembling the smallest possible manipulating coalition can be expressed as an integer linear program, in which the variables are the numbers of voters of each type (x t ) to recruit; • The integrality and upper bound (x t ≤ N t ) constraints of this program may be ignored (Propositions 4 and 5).
• Only manipulations in favour of the second-placegetter need be considered (Proposition 7).
• Coalition recruiting may be limited to those voters who rank the two leading candidates a and b adjacent, as these voters are best able to manipulate (Proposition 8). • We may find the minimum coalition size by considering only the members' (sincere) rankings of a and b, without regard to how they rank other candidates (Propositions 9 and 10). This reduces the problem to a mere linear program with m − 1 variables and two constraints. • Replacing this linear program with its dual gives us two variables and m − 1 constraints.
To specify an attempted coalitional manipulation, we must specify for each t ∈ T the number x t of coalition members of (sincere preference) type t, as well as the number y t of coalition members who will insincerely vote t. Of course, we must have t∈T x t = t∈T y t . Proposition 3 suggests that it will be enough to consider manipulation only at profiles (or voting situations) for which there is a clear winner a (i.e. a candidate with |a| > |α| for each α = a). For such profiles, we will consider a manipulation attempt successful if it results in the score of another candidate (or tied group of candidates) matching or exceeding the score of a.
For a coalition to successfully manipulate in favour of a candidate β, its members must all be of types which prefer β to a. LetT βa ⊆ T be the set of such types.
Additionally, it is clear that the coalition members need only consider insincere votes of types which rank β in first place; this is a dominant strategy for such manipulations. Let T β be the set of such types.
Let M CS be the minimum size of a successful manipulating coalition (or ∞ if no manipulation is possible). Then in the light of Proposition 3 and the above remarks we have
We now aim to show that, for IC asymptotic purposes, we may drop the constraints x t ≤ N t and x t , y t ∈ Z in (1) . This is as we should expect: each N t will be about n/m!, while the differences between candidates' scores (and hence, presumably, coalition sizes) are only of order √ n. Similarly, the requirement that x t and y t be integral should not be much of a hindrance when dealing with large numbers of voters.
To this end, consider Q 2 (β), defined in the same way as Q 1 (β), except that we drop the integrality constraints x t , y t ∈ Z in (1), and replace the constraint x t ≤ N t by x t ≤ N t − K, where K is a constant that depends only on the voting rule. It will be convenient to choose
Define Q 3 (β) in the same way as Q 2 (β), except that the upper bound constraint on x t is dropped entirely. Note that
Proof. Define f 0 : R T → [0, ∞] as follows: for q ∈ R T , f 0 (q) is the optimal value of the linear program min t∈T βa
. Note that f 0 (λq + µe) = λf 0 (q) for any q ∈ R T , λ ≥ 0, and µ ∈ R. Also, f 0 is continuous on the closed subset K = {q : f 0 (q) < ∞} of R T . Let π : R T → K be the projection which maps each point q ∈ R T to the nearest point of K to q; then π is continuous and π(λq + µe) = λπ(q) + µe for any q ∈ R T , λ ≥ 0, and µ ∈ R.
). Then f is continuous; has f (λq + µe) = λf (q) for any q ∈ R T , λ ≥ 0, and µ ∈ R; and Q 3 
When Q 3 (β) = ∞, we have Q 2 (β) = ∞ too. On the other hand, when Q 3 (β) ≤ min t N t − K, the corresponding optimal point of the linear program for Q 3 (β) is also feasible for the linear program for Q 2 (β), so Q 2 (β) = Q 3 (β). Hence
and so it suffices to show that this last event has probability converging to 0.
. By Proposition 1 and the continuity of h, we have
This yields
for any λ > 0. That is,
We have n/m! − λ √ n − K > 0 for sufficiently large n, so
Since λ was arbitrary,
and the result follows.
Proposition 5.
With probability 1,
Proof of Proposition 5 for the case w m−1 < 1. Let (x t ) t∈T βa , (y t ) t∈T β be optimal for the problem defining Q 2 (β). Then
Choose types t 0 ∈T βa , t 1 ∈ T β such that t 0 ranks a last, β next-to-last, and some γ first, while t 1 is obtained from t 0 by transposing the rankings of β and γ. Define (x t ) t∈T βa , (y t ) t∈T β by x t0 = x t0 + K, y t1 = y t1 + K, and x t = x t and y t = y t for all other t. Then (x t ), (y t ) satisfy
Now obtain (x t ) t∈T βa , (y t ) t∈T β by rounding each x t , y t to an integral value. The choice between rounding up and rounding down (i.e. between x t = x t and x t = x t ) can be made arbitrarily, but should be done in such a way that t∈T β y t = t∈T βa x t . Since x t − x t ≤ 1 and y t − y t ≤ 1, we obtain
and so (x t ), (y t ) are feasible for (1) . We have t∈T βa x t = t∈T βa x t + K, from which it follows that Q 1 (β) ≤ Q 2 (β) + K.
Proof of Proposition 5 for the case w m−1 = 1. A separate proof is required for this case (the anti-plurality rule w = (1, . . . , 1, 0)). We can show that Q 1 (β) ≤ Q 2 (β) by showing that the optimal (x t ), (y t ) for the problem defining Q 2 (β) are always integral (and hence give a feasible solution to (1)). To establish this, we will use a well-known result in linear programming (see, e.g. [10] or [11]), which assures us that the optimal solution of a linear program will always be integral when the constraint coefficient matrix A is totally unimodular (i.e. every square submatrix has determinant 1, −1, or 0).
A useful sufficient condition for total unimodularity is given in [10] (Theorem 13.3) as follows: a matrix whose entries are all 1, −1, or 0 is totally unimodular if each column has at most two non-zero entries, and if the rows can be partitioned into two sets I 1 and I 2 such that: (i) if a column has two entries of the same sign, their rows are in different sets; (ii) if a column has two entries of different signs, their rows are in the same set.
For this problem A has columns corresponding to the variables x t (t ∈T βa ) and y t (t ∈ T β ). There is one row corresponding to each candidate α = β, in which the entry in the column corresponding to x t is −1 if t ranks α last, and 0 otherwise; the entry in the column corresponding to y t is 1 if t ranks α last, and 0 otherwise. Let these rows constitute the set I 1 . There is also a further row corresponding to the constraint t∈T β y t − t∈T βa x t = 0; in this row, the entries in the columns corresponding to the x t are all −1, and those corresponding to the y t are all 1. Let this row constitute the set I 2 . It is clear that this matrix satisfies the sufficient condition above; the result follows.
Proof. From Propositions 4 and 5 we have
The result then follows from the earlier observation that P (M CS = min β =a Q 1 (β)) → 1 .
Now that we have effectively eliminated, for our purposes, the integrality and upper-bound constraints in (1), we can further simplify the description of the minimum manipulating coalition size. Suppose b is the candidate with second-highest score after a. The next result consists of the observation that only manipulations in favour of b need now be considered.
Proof. Let (x t ) t∈T βa , (y t ) t∈T β be optimal for the problem defining Q 3 (β), some β = b. Form (x t ) t∈T βa , (y t ) t∈T β by transposing β and b in all the voter types involved. (So if types s and t are related by transposition of the ranks of β and b, then x s = x t .) We have, for any α,
Since |β| ≤ |b|, we see that (x t ), (y t ) are feasible for the problem defining Q 3 (b), and give the same objective value. The result follows.
We next show that a manipulating coalition may always be formed by recruiting only voters who sincerely rank b and a adjacent. Let T i ⊂ T consist of those types which rank b in ith place and a in (i + 1)st place, and
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Let Q denote the optimal value of (2) (or ∞ if (2) is infeasible).
Proof. For t ∈ T i , let τ (t) ⊆T ba consist of those types which (i) agree with t in ranking positions i + 1, . . . , m; and (ii) rank the remaining candidates, other than b, in either the same position as t does, or one place lower. Observe that {τ (t) : t ∈ T ba } is a partition ofT ba , and that for s ∈ τ (t), α = b
(This implies that a voter of type s ∈ τ (t) can always be dismissed from the manipulating coalition and replaced with one of type t.)
Hence (x t ) is feasible for (2) . The result follows.
Our efforts thus far have established that P (|M CS − Q| ≤ K) → 1 as n → ∞. This will ensure that for IC asymptotic purposes, we may replace our original description of the minimum manipulating coalition size with the more tractable problem (2) . Our next step results in a considerable further simplification of the linear program.
wherew = (w 1 + · · · + w m )/m. Then there exists (x t ) t∈T ba , (y t ) t∈T b feasible for (2), with t∈Ti x t = z i .
Remark. The conclusion of this result asserts that we may arrange a successful manipulation in which z i members of the coalition are of types in T i , for each i = 1, . . . , m − 1.
Note that if z i voters of types in T i all cast insincere votes which rank b first, the score of b will be increased by z i (1 − w i ). If they all cast insincere votes which rank a last, the score of a will be decreased by z i w i+1 . Thus, the first inequality of (3) makes it possible for b to catch up to a. The second inequality of (3) makes it possible for b to catch up to the average candidate's score. It is remarkable that these two (apparently rather weak) linear conditions are sufficient to make manipulation possible.
Proof. Let D be the set of candidates other than a or b. For any type t ∈ T , we denote by t(i) the candidate ranked in ith place by t.
We will write our proposed (x t ), (y t ) in terms of parameters r and (u α ) α∈D , which are to be determined later in such a way that 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, u α ≥ 0 ∀α, and α∈D u α = 1.
For
, o t h e r w i s e 7 (this corresponds to ru α z i voters of types in T i changing sincere votes of form . . . ba . . . α to insincere ones b . . . α . . . a, for each i = 1, . . . , m − 2);
,o t h e r w i s e (this corresponds to (1 − r)v α z i voters of types in T i changing sincere votes of form α . . . ba . . . to insincere ones b . . . αa . . ., for each i = 2, . . . , m − 2);
,o t h e r w i s e ;
(this corresponds to (1 − r)z 1 voters of types in T 1 leaving their votes unchanged); The reader may verify that
We now verify that the inequality constraints of (2) hold. Note that t∈T ba
The inequality constraint for α = a in (2) thus reduces to
Now consider the other inequality constraints. We use the notationw −i,j,k to denote the average of all elements of w other than the ith, jth, and kth (i.e.
It follows that
The (x t ), (y t ) that we have constructed will thus satisfy the constraints required to be feasible for (2), provided r 9 and (u α ) can be chosen in such a way that
Suppose for the moment that m ≥ 4. Then the inequality required of u α may be written
a simple upper bound on u α . Note that the upper bound is non-negative. For given r, it will be possible to choose non-negative (u α ) such that α∈D u α = 1 while complying with these upper bounds if and only if
using the fact that the sum of all the candidates' scores is mnw.
Consider now the case m = 3. Then the sole α ∈ D has u α = v α = 1, and the inequality required of u α reduces to 2B − rA ≥ |α| − |b| , which is ( * ). We have thus reduced our requirements to a condition on r ∈ [0, 1]:
To see that there exists r ∈ [0, 1] satisfying this condition we note that, firstly,
(from the first condition of (3)); and thirdly,
This last condition can be simplified to
the second condition of (3).
Corollary 10. The linear program (2) has the same optimal value as the following one.
Proof. Theorem 9 shows that for any feasible point of (4), there corresponds a feasible point of (2) with the same objective value. Hence the optimal value of (2) cannot be greater than that of (4).
To show that the optimal value of (2) cannot be less than that of (4), suppose we have (
from which the first constraint of (4) can be seen to hold.
If we add the inequalities in (2) for all α = b, we obtain
which gives
from which the second constraint of (4) can be seen to hold.
Theorem 11. The linear programs (2) and (4) have the same objective value as the following one.
Also, (5) is unbounded if and only if (2) and (4) are infeasible.
Proof. The linear program (4) has the same objective value as its dual program ([1, p. 251]):
Remark. We have now replaced our original description of the minimum manipulating coalition size with the simple two-variable linear program (5) . This will be exploited in the remaining sections of the paper.
IC asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size
The results of the previous section have established that
Note in particular that the constraint set M w does not depend on the voting situation, but only on the voting rule. For a given rule, it is possible to identify the corresponding M w (a two-dimensional linear polytope), and then to identify the (finitely many) vertices of M w which may achieve the optimum Q. This often leads to an explicit expression for Q in terms of |a| and |b|. Furthermore, we have (|a| , |b|) = (ρ 1 (S), ρ 2 (S)), where ρ j (x) denotes the jth largest element of a vector x. Proposition 2 gives us
and so it follows that
by the converging-together lemma ([5, p.91]). Consequently,
That is, the asymptotic probability that the voting situation is manipulable by a coalition of v √ n or fewer voters is computable as a (non-decreasing) function of v. This function depends only on the voting rule.
A further observation will be helpful in determining which vertices of M w may achieve the above maximum. If x ∈ R m has mean elementx = (x 1 + · · · + x m )/m, then
We note in passing that for all rules other than the anti-plurality rule w = (1, . . . , 1, 0), M w is a bounded set, since the constraints defining it include (1 − w m−1 )µ ≤ 1. Hence V w is a finite-valued random variable. It follows that P (M CS = ∞) → 0 as n → ∞. For the anti-plurality rule itself, M w is unbounded and V w may take ∞ as a value; see below for further detail.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to carrying out the above analysis for some common positional voting rules.
Note that the point with λ = µ = (m − 1)/(m − 2) satisfies each of the constraints with equality. So M w is the triangle with vertices at (0, 0), (0, m−1 m−2 ), and ( m−1 m−2 , m−1 m−2 ); the last of these always achieves the optimum Q. Thus, a good approximation to the minimum manipulating coalition size is
For the corresponding asymptotic result, note that
.
The corresponding asymptotic result is
As a consequence of this, we can find the limiting probability that an anti-plurality election is invulnerable to manipulation: lim
The limit is positive, a property unique to anti-plurality. For all other positional rules, lim n P (M CS = ∞) = 0, a result essentially contained in [7] .
Plurality and k-approval rules:
The simple plurality rule is included here as the case k = 1. The constraints defining M w reduce to 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ ≤ 1, so M w is the triangle with vertices at (0, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 1); the last of these always achieves the optimum. Thus, our approximation of the minimum manipulating coalition size is simply
While this expression is valid for all k-approval rules (1 ≤ k ≤ m − 2), different values of k will give rise to different probability distributions for (|a| , |b|), and so different asymptotic results for M CS. We havew = k/m and
Three-candidate "easy case" rules: w = (1, 1 − p, 0) where 1/2 ≤ p ≤ 1. This family includes the 3-candidate versions of plurality voting (p = 1) and Borda's rule (p = 1/2). The constraints defining M w are 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ, (1 − p)λ ≤ 1, and pµ ≤ 1. Thus M w is the triangle with vertices at (0, 0), (0, p −1 ), and (p −1 , p −1 ); the last of these always achieves the optimum. Thus Q = p −1 (|a| − |b|).
We have σ 2 w = 2(1 − p + p 2 )/9; it follows from this that
Three-candidate "hard case" rules: w = (1, 1 − p, 0) where 0 < p ≤ 1/2. This family includes the remaining 3candidate positional rules not already considered. For these rules, M w is the quadrilateral with vertices at (0, 0),
Four-candidate rules. For m ≥ 4 it would be tedious to reduce all possible cases to asymptotic expressions of the kind above. Instead, we have simply illustrated the sets σ w M w for a variety of rules w in 
Comparisons between positional voting rules.
In this section we compare the various positional voting rules with respect to their manipulability under IC asymptotic conditions. It is apparent from Figure 2 that the susceptibility of voting rules to coalitional manipulation depends on the size of the coalition involved. The graph for m = 3, for example, shows that elections using the plurality or Borda rules are highly likely to be manipulable by a large coalition (at least 2 √ n voters), whereas only about half of anti-plurality elections are so manipulable. But, if one is more concerned about manipulation by small groups, the graph shows that plurality and anti-plurality elections are about equally susceptible to manipulation by coalitions of less than 0.25 √ n voters, while Borda is rather less susceptible. This suggests that there will be no single rule which is clearly superior to all others with respect to IC coalitional manipulation. However, some are clearly inferior to others. The asymptotic manipulation probability g w (v) for the plurality rule, for example, is greater than for the other two 3-candidate rules shown for all values of v.
More formally, given two m-candidate positional voting rules w, w , we will say that w dominates w (and write
That is, w is less susceptible than w to manipulation by coalitions of any given size. Alternatively, the asymptotic minimum coalition size V w is larger than V w in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Note that gives a partial order on the rules. Although the present paper is concerned only with positional rules, the partial order could be defined in the same way for any voting rules.
If w w, then the rule w is to be preferred to w . More generally, the best rules to use (at least from the point of view of manipulation by IC populations) are those not dominated by any other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proof. Indeed, plurality is dominated both by anti-plurality and by Borda. This is apparent from the asymptotic results of the previous section:
giving V plurality ≤ V antiplurality and so (plurality) (anti-plurality). Similarly for Borda.
Proposition 13. The anti-plurality rule is never dominated.
Proof. No other rule w may dominate the anti-plurality rule, because lim v→∞ g antiplurality (v) = P ρ 2 (Z) ≥Z < 1, whereas lim v→∞ g w (v) = 1.
Proposition 13 is true because the anti-plurality rule is resistant to manipulation by very large coalitions, in a way that every other positional rule is not. However, as we shall see later, this advantage becomes very slight in elections with 6 or more candidates.
Proposition 14.
Borda's rule is undominated for m ∈ {3, 4}, but dominated for m ≥ 5.
Proof. From the asymptotic results of the previous section:
Note that for m ≥ 5,
This gives V Borda ≤ V m/2 −approval and so (Borda) ( m/2 -approval). Now let m ∈ {3, 4} and let w be any positional rule for m-candidate elections. We may observe that
It is shown in [12] that the quantity σ w b w is maximized, over all m-candidate positional rules, by Borda's rule. (This is true only when m ∈ {3, 4}; for m ≥ 5, the maximum value is achieved by the m/2 -approval rule.) From this we obtain
Let c = (m/(m − 1)) 1/2 σ Borda b Borda . Since all orderings of Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z m ) are equally likely,
where f is the (non-degenerate) bivariate normal probability density of (Z 1 − Z 2 ,Z − Z 2 ). It follows that
and hence that w cannot dominate Borda. The argument used in Proposition 14 shows that among all positional rules for three-or four-candidate elections, Borda's rule has the g function with the smallest derivative at the origin. This means that it is the most resistant to manipulation by very small coalitions. However, this property does not hold when there are five or more candidates. In that case, it is the m/2 -approval rule which enjoys maximal resistance to manipulation by very small coalitions. These results are similar to those of [12], although the criterion considered there is the "average threshhold coalition size" rather than the minimum manipulating coalition size of the present paper. 18 anti-plurality from a manipulation point of view. Anti-plurality has a slight additional chance of resisting attack by a large coalition -and on this basis dominates plurality -but this advantage has become almost imperceptible by m = 6. Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the rules when there are many candidates. In this figure, the curves for the antiplurality rule have been left out, as they are indistinguishable from those for plurality. We see the m/2 -approval rule dominating the others. It should be noted, though, that the IC hypothesis is possibly unconvincing when applied to elections with many candidates, as it assumes in effect that all candidates are about equally popular.
Conclusions.
The technique presented in this paper makes it possible to compute the (IC) limiting probability distribution of the minimum manipulating coalition size for any positional rule, with any number of candidates.
The consideration of coalition sizes is especially useful when comparing the rules. Some rules are especially resistant to manipulation by small coalitions, while others fare better with respect to manipulation by large coalitions. Previous work has made this distinction in a rather limited way, by considering "individual" and "coalitional" manipulation (the latter meaning that the coalition may be of any size). But these extremes may be somewhat uninformative. Given a large voter population, all positional rules (except anti-plurality) are highly likely to be manipulable by some coalition, and highly unlikely to be manipulable by any individual. Studying coalitions of intermediate sizes starts to reveal more differences between the rules.
The picture also changes when the number of candidates is varied. Much previous work has concentrated on the three-candidate case, for which the behaviour of the rules is quite different (Borda is least susceptible to smallcoalition manipulation, anti-plurality to large-coalition manipulation). The four-candidate case is similar, except that the differences between rules are smaller. But when there are five candidates, it appears that all positional rules are about equally manipulable, across the whole range of coalition sizes, and there is not much to choose between them. With six or more candidates, the m/2 -approval rules emerge as favourites.
Another, perhaps surprising, conclusion is that for m ≥ 5 there is very little difference between plurality and anti-plurality from a manipulation point of view. The approximate symmetry between these rules does not appear when m = 3, and so does not appear to have been noticed before (although it was recognized in a more limited sense already in [14]).
It would be possible in principle to produce results like those in this paper for the IAC voter behaviour model. However, the technique of analysis would have to be quite different. Rather than reducing the probabilities to those involving normal distributions, the calculations would entail the computation of convex volumes, as outlined in [16].
It would also be of interest to produce limiting distributions similar to those in this paper (or at least, graphs like those in Figures 2-4) for voting rules other than positional rules. Approval voting ( [2] ) would be an especially attractive target. However, this too would require new techniques.
